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ABSTRACT

Contemporary European public law is marked by the uneasy
relationship between national constitutional democracies and the
executive-based supranational governance of the European Union.
Whereas constitutional democracy remains the dominant source of
inspiration for European institutional imagination, the supranational
executive has relentlessly expanded its scope and institutionalculture to
key policy fields at the core of national constitutional democracies. This
article tracks the rise of the supranationalexecutive by examining three
relational paradigms developed between national constitutional
democracies and the European Union in distinctphases of the European
integration process (i.e., the complementarity paradigm in the
foundational period; the competition paradigm in the transformative
period; and the encroachment paradigm during the economic and
financial crisis). Following this account, this article claims that the
supranationalexecutive, owing to its predominance and ethos, corrodes
and gradually displaces national constitutional democracies, bestowing
an increasingly post-political character to European public law. This
article concludes by discussing the possibilities to reverse the current
institutional trend and to realign Europe's institutional reality and
constitutional imagination.
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INTRODUCTION

Contemporary European public law is marked by the uneasy
relationship between national constitutional democracies and the
executive-based supranational governance of the European Union (EU).
Constitutional democracy occupies a special place in European
institutional imagination' for it promises a legal and political order
securing collective self-government, the protection of a rich catalogue of
fundamental rights, and an institutional framework mediating
otherwise intractable conflicts revolving around competing visions of
social justice and, more in general, of the common good. 2 Yet, despite its
uncontested ideological status, nowadays constitutional democracy
struggles to shape legal and political reality. To a considerable extent,
this difficulty has to do with a challenge inherent in the EU policy
objectives and institutional architecture. Latent in the symbiotic
relationship between national constitutional democracies and the
supranational executive characterizing European public law ever since
the end of World War II, this challenge has eventually materialized
with the economic and financial crisis. In the absence of sufficient social
prerequisites and political agency to develop a pan-European
constitutional democracy, the European Union has adopted a highly
controversial set of policy measures and institutional arrangements to
stabilize the economic system. 3 These instruments have expanded the
remit of the Union and exported its modus operandi into salient policy
fields at the core of national constitutional democracies. Although this
strategy has so far yielded dubious policy outcomes, its impact on
national self-collective determination and the fundamental rights
associated with the welfare state has been corrosive. 4 To account for this
distress, a large number of commentators and scholars identify the
executive-based structure of supranational policy-making as one of the
main culprits. Although this camp hosts a variety of remarkably
different views and proposals alternative to the status quo, a consensus
exists on the notion that, in its current form, the supranational

1. See Martin Loughlin, The Constitutional Imagination, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(2015).
2. See Dieter Grimm, The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a
Changed World, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 3, 3-4 (Petra Dobner & Martin
Loughlin eds., 2010).
3. See generally Alexander Somek, Europe: Politwal, Not Cosmopolitan, 20 EuR. L.J.
142, 142-45 (2014) (providing an example of how the EU has adopted policy measures to
stabilize the economic system).
4. See Augustin Jos4 Men6ndez, The Existential Crisis of the European Union, 14
GER. L.J. 453, 511-20 (2013).
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executive encroaches on national democratic structures 5 and stifles
Europe's democratic potential.6
As criticism reaches the point of tracing alarming analogies between
the current architecture of EU economic governance and Europe's
authoritarian drift in the interwar period,7 it may be of some interest to
examine the rise of the supranational executive by focusing on its
evolving interactions with national constitutional democracies
throughout the European integration process. This article tracks this
trajectory by focusing on three distinct phases of the European
integration process: the foundational period (1951-86), in which
national constitutional democracies and the supranational executive
coexisted in a complementary relationship; the transformative period
(1986-2007), where the supranational executive expanded its scope to
transform national social government and ended up competing with
national constitutional democracies; and the current period opened by
the economic and financial crisis, in which the supranational executive
encroaches on national constitutional democracies. Following this
account, it is argued that the supranational executive, owing to its
predominance and ethos, corrodes and gradually displaces national
constitutional democracies, bestowing an increasingly post-political
character to European public law.
The article concludes by discussing the possibilities to reverse the
current institutional trend and to realign Europe's institutional reality
and constitutional imagination. As the prospects for recovering the
original equilibrium of the foundational period or establishing a panEuropean constitutional democracy remain similarly implausible, a
more realistic option is offered by proposals aimed at establishing a
more politicized version of the supranational executive that is more
sensitive to the claims and structures of national constitutional
democracies. But given that at the moment these proposals do not seem
5. See generally WOLFGANG

STREECK,

BUYING TIME:

THE DELAYED

CRISIS OF

DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (2014) (placing the financial and economic crisis of 2008 in the
context of the long neoliberal transformation of postwar capitalism that began in the
1970s and analyzing the subsequent tensions and conflicts involving states, governments,
voters and capitalist interests, as expressed in inflation, public debt, and rising private
indebtedness).
6. See, e.g., JO7RGEN HABERMAS, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A RESPONSE
(Ciaran Cronin trans.) (2012); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE LURE OF TECHNOCRACY (Ciaran

Cronin trans.) (2015).
7. See generally William E. Scheuerman, Herman Heller and the European Crisis:
Authoritarian Liberalism Redux?, 21 EUR. L.J. 302 (2015) (identifying in contemporary
neoliberal arrangements in Europe a predisposition at insulating politically instituted
markets from democratic politics similar to the authoritarian liberal regime described by
Herman Heller in 1933); Michael A. Wilkinson, AuthoritarianLiberalism in the European
ConstitutionalImagination:Second Time as a Farce?, 21 EUR. L.J. 313 (2015) (same).
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to produce sufficient intellectual impetus and political mobilization, the
possibility should not be ruled out that European public law will remain
stuck in the current post-political configuration.
I. THE FOUNDATIONAL PERIOD AND THE COMPLEMENTARITY PARADIGM

The starting point to explore European evolving public law
arrangements may conveniently be situated in the aftermath of World
War II. The end of the war opened a rather long period that witnessed
the foundation of both national constitutional democracies and
supranational institutions, and the establishment of a pattern of
relationships between them that would mark European public law until
the Single European Act. 8
The centrality of constitutional democracy in European institutional
imagination dates back to the achievements of this period. Immediately
after the war, legal and political resources were prevailingly employed
to heal divisions in national societies, reconstruct national economies,
and re-found national political communities. Although implicated in
these developments, the European integration process was originally
conceived as a more modest project.9 In those years, most of the political
and institutional efforts were devoted to the enactment of democratic
constitutions, and documents celebrating collective democratic selfdetermination, social emancipation, and human dignity as their
normative focal points.o Key to the new national legal and political
order was the idea that the constitution is not meant to decide
legitimate social conflicts, but to establish the formal and substantive
prerequisites for democratic competition." Accordingly, its task is firstly
securing an adequate institutional setting for the mediation of political
conflicts, then ensuring that their acting out does not jeopardize
political pluralism.1 2 In the words of Chantal Mouffe, "conflict, in order

8. Single European Act, 17 February 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 506.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See generally ALEXANDER SOMEK, THE COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION

134-75

(2014) (discussing the challenges faced by the German constitution and other constitutions
relating to human dignity and exploring three themes: (1) by virtue of their humanity
human beings are ends in themselves and must not be treated as mere means; (2) freedom
depends on the realization of community; and (3) dignity may entail obligations and not
only rights for those who possess it).
11. See Dieter Grimm, The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation:The European
Case, 21 EuR. L.J. 460, 464 (2015) ("The function of constitutions is to legitimise and to
limit political power, but not to replace it. Constitutions are a framework for politics, not
the blueprint for all political decisions.").
12. On the relationship between social conflicts and public law, see Marco Dani,
RehabilitatingSocial Conflicts in EuropeanPublic Law, 18 EUR. L.J. 621, 622-25 (2012).
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to be accepted as legitimate, needs to take a form that does not destroy
the political association. This means that some kind of common bond
must exist between the parties in conflict, so that they will not treat
their opponents as enemies to be eradicated, seeing their demands
illegitimate . . . ."13 This notion resonates in the structure of democratic
constitutions, where conflict and cooperation are conceptually separated
giving rise to distinct domains in which constituted and constituent
power acquire a renewed historical meaning.' 4
In charge of the domain of social cooperation, constituent power
stands, in principle, isolated from ordinary political conflict. The task of
defining the terms of political association requires political parties qua
constitution-makers to set aside their routine distributive struggles and
engage in constitutional politics. This entails a cooperative effort in
which each party is expected to reach across the boundaries of its
particular worldview and political goals on behalf of peaceful
coexistence. The overall result is a form of consensual politics that,
inaugurated with the approval of a new constitution, reemerges
subsequently in the less spectacular forms of constitutional adjudication
and constitutional amendment. Admittedly, constitutional politics also
involves a certain degree of contestation and, frequently, constitutionmakers cannot attain more than a "conflictual consensus."1 5 However,
this is the only form of political unity available in the circumstances of
pluralism. 16 Constitutions can no longer prescribe, entrench, and impose
the values, decisions, and institutional solutions favored by a particular
segment of society.' 7 To make a claim of legitimate authority,
constitutions provide a shared symbolic space and an institutional
setting allowing the identification and representation of virtually all the
segments of society. As a genuine creature of the people, the
constitution cannot but reflect its elusive consensus and irreducible
pluralism.'

8

13. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL
14. See GUSTAVO ZAGREBELSKY, LA LEGGE

19-20 (2005).
E LA SUA GIUSTIZIA [THE LAW AND ITS

JUSTICE] 131-57 (2009).
15. See MOUFFE, supranote 13, at 52.

16. See Roberto Bin, Che cos'd la Costituzione? [What Is the Constitution?], 27
QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 11, 22-25 (2007).

17. See SOMEK, supra note 10, at 82-84 (observing that democratic constitutions are
only formally programmatic).
18. This may be exemplified by the notion of human dignity. See id. at 140 ("[Human
dignity] stands for some 'overlapping consensus' on decency whose effectiveness depends
decidedly on abandoning the idea of a unified conception. Any more ambitious
reconstruction would be inadequate to its object, for it is intrinsic to dignity to serve as an
integrative symbol by virtue of being barely understood.").

404

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:2

Within a similar legal and political framework, constituted power
emerges as the domain of partisanship and political competition. The
open nature of constitutions leaves broad room to the ordinary political
conflicts of the industrial society and majoritarian decision-making.
Objectives such as social justice are sufficiently defined to rule out both
socialist rule and unrestrained laissez-faire.19 The ideas that markets
not socially embedded are unstable and that social policies are required
to make capitalism acceptable pervade ruling political parties. 20 But
apart from this general consensus, the specific level of protection of
economic freedoms and property rights and the exact definition of social
entitlements depend to a large extent on the outcomes of political and
social disputes for the direction of government and the contents of
legislation taking place in representative assemblies. 21
While constitutional democracies are being established, the
European integration process is taking its first steps giving rise to a
legal and political order characterized by a distinct ideology, rationality,
and legal culture. Absent the social and political preconditions
sustaining constitutional democracy at the national level, such as a
thick collective identity and a reasonably strong sense of solidarity, the
possibility of establishing a fully-fledged pan-European political
community appears foreclosed. 22 Instead, European integration begins
as a purely intergovernmental and rather unspectacular undertaking.
The pursuit of peace and prosperity are the ideals justifying the
establishment of supranational institutions. 23 In particular, economic
motives seem to motivate European integration.24 Supranational
institutions are expected to increase the capacity of national
governments to govern transnational problems and improve the quality
of national policymaking. 25 For this reason, they are entrusted with a
set of regulatory powers circumscribed to the less politically salient

19.

See DAVID

MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 3-4 (1999).

20. See Floris de Witte, The Architecture of a 'Social Market Economy' 2-4 (LSE Law,
Society & Econ., Working Paper No. 13, 2015).
21. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335
(2009) (exploring what makes legislation an attractive mode of lawmaking compared to
lawmaking by judges, decree, executive agencies, treaties, or custom).
22. See FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 7-9

(1999).
23. On the ideals originally inspiring European integration, see J. H. H. WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?' AND OTHER

ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 244-56 (1999).
24. See Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Settlement, 31 WORLD ECON.
157, 167 (2008) (stressing the importance of instrumental rather than idealistic reasons).
25. See Robert 0. Keohane et al., Democracy-EnhancingMultilateralism, 63 INT'L ORG.
1, 4-5 (2009).
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26
policy areas concerning market regulation. As a result, the original
structure of European public law follows a rather neat division of labor
in which collective decision-making processes with more significant
redistributive implications remain governed at the national level under
democratic constitutions, while efficiency-driven regulatory processes
are delegated to supranational institutions. 27 The task of the latter,
however, is instrumental to the operation of national constitutional
democracies: the discipline of the negative externalities of national
policymaking, the promotion of allocative efficiency, and individual
emancipation through free movement. These are all goals that, in the
intentions of original member states, are part of the state-(re)building
undertaking characterizing the foundational period.
This instrumental connotation emerges also from a procedural
perspective. Supranational institutions operate on the basis of a formal
delegation that links the exercise of regulatory powers by nonstate
28
institutions to national democratic constitutions. As a consequence,
the activity of supranational institutions is legitimate not only for the
outputs delivered 29 but also for the continuous oversight by institutions
30
such as national
endowed with superior legitimacy resources,
31
executives, parliaments, and courts.
The distinctiveness of supranational law emerges not only from its
objectives and standards of legitimacy but also from its institutional
culture. The pursuit of the original supranational goals is articulated in
two distinct regulatory strategies. Negative integration supranational
law, by means of binding principles and independent institutions (the
Commission and the European Court of Justice), imposes external legal
constraints on national political institutions to contrast factions, protect
underrepresented groups, and improve the epistemic basis of decisionmaking. 32 This strategy expresses clearly the disciplinary vocation of
supranational law to counter the dysfunctions or the excesses of
national policies, in those years identified essentially in protectionism
and discrimination. 33

26. See Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit Reassessing
Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603, 606-10 (2002).
27. See Giandomenico Majone, Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why
Democracies Need Non-MajoritarianInstitutions 10 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper No.
96/57, 1996).
28. See PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE

NATION-STATE 47-48, 56-57 (2010).
29. See SCHARPF, supra note 22, at 12-13.
30. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 53.
31. See id. at 88-90.
32. See Keohane et al., supra note 25, at 9-22.
33. See WEILER, supra note 23, at 341.
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In positive integration, instead, the conferral of regulatory powers to
supranational institutions aims at creating at a supranational level the
political capacity required to cope with problems with a transnational
dimension.3 4 Yet, the nature of supranational institutions and their
mode of operation depart considerably from the legislative culture
developed at the national level around representative lawmaking. This
emerges first of all in the predominance of executive-based institutions
in the so-called Community Method. Supranational lawmaking is the
product
of
intergovernmental
bargaining
involving
national
governments (Council) and supranational officials (Commission).3 5 This
originates a type of consensual lawmaking3 6 pervaded by the ethos of
diplomacy with scant transparency and parliamentary accountability.3 7
Secondly, supranational legislation takes place in the interstices of
treaty principles as interpreted by the Court of Justice.38 Entrusted
with the task of articulating the common market project, supranational
legislative bodies do not benefit from the same degree of political
latitude enjoyed by national parliaments, but occupy a position more
akin to that of a special regulator.39 The predominance of executivebased institutions and their reduced scope for political action leads to a
third element distinguishing supranational lawmaking from national
legislation. Supranational lawmaking is presented as a largely technical
and depoliticized matter. 40 This democratically uninspiring sublimation
of political conflicts and social cleavages owes in part to the nature of
the regulated policy fields and in part to the search of consensus
required by treaty legal bases. 41 Yet technocratic depoliticization
functions also as a convenient ideological cover for ushering in a new
regime of rulemaking shielded from parliamentary interference. 42 Thus,
only at the level of declamation is the delegation of regulatory powers to
supranational institutions justified by lofty ideals associated with the
creation of "an ever closer Union." More pragmatically, delegation
allows national governments to establish horizontal ties among
themselves with a view to strengthening their position vis-A-vis their
domestic societies, insulating policymaking from partisanship and
34. See SCHARPF, supra note 22, at 13.
35. See Moravesik, supra note 24, at 163-64.
36. See infra PartI.
37. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 204.
38. See Gareth Davies, The European Union Legislature as an Agent of the European
Court of Justice, 54 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 846, 846 (2016).
39. See id. at 848.
40. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 34.
41. See Paul Craig, Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU
LAW, 13, 16 (Paul Craig & Grdinne De Bdirca eds., 2d ed. 2011).
42. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 105.
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their
relativizing
eventually,
and,
electioneering 43
short-term
commitment to constitutional democracy.
In the light of all these elements, it can safely be said that from the
outset the supranational executive establishes with a constitutional
democracy an ambiguous relationship. On the one hand, its operation is
meant to cope with the failures of the member states to live up to their
44
Supranational lawmaking is an
constitutional democratic ideals.
outlet for effective problem solving, particularly in fields such as market
regulation, consumer protection, and environmental policy in which
45
supranational
Moreover,
national policy making is deficient.
institutions have the capacity to correct national regulatory biases such
46
On the other hand, the
as protectionism and discrimination.
supranational executive expresses a post-political predisposition that
The European
democracies.
constitutional
challenges national
47
Communities are depoliticized entities with a depoliticizing potential.
The idea of insulating policy making from democratic contestation, the
emphasis on expertise and consensus as the main sources of legitimacy,
and the scepticism toward representative lawmaking are all aspects of a
legal and political culture alternative to the idea of legitimating and
national
inspiring in those years
mediating social conflicts
constitutional democracies. But the distance between the constitutional
democracies and supranational law emerges even more clearly at a
more structural level: by entrenching in the treaties a coherent
regulatory project aimed at market integration, supranational law
develops a legal culture defying the idea of constitutional democracy.
The treaties are no longer the place for an open compromise between
opposing worldviews and political forces: rather than being the place
where the left and the right reach a conflictual consensus, they are the
locus in which what is right is decided. Within a similar legal
framework, the room for legitimate political contestation is narrowed
down, 48 relegating politics (or what remains of it) essentially to the
technocratic implementation of a predefined regulatory project.
Opponents of this project, as a result, are viewed as enemies rather

43. See CHRISTOPHER J. BICKERTON, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: FROM NATION-STATES
TO MEMBER STATES 52 (2012).

&

44. See Keohane et al., supra note 25, at 9.
45. See Anand Menon & Stephen Weatherill, Democratic Politics in a Globalising
World- Supranationalismand Legitimacy in the European Union 6-7, 12 (LSE Law,
Society & Econ., Working Paper No. 13, 2007).
46. See id. at 9.
47. See Peter Mair, Political Opposition and the European Union, 42 GOV'T
OPPOSITION 1, 7-8 (2007).

48. See id. at 13-14.
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than as adversaries for, in this context, their claims appear
illegitimate. 49
Nevertheless, throughout the foundational period, the post-political
challenge inherent in the ethos and structure of the supranational
executive fails to materialize. This can be explained by referring to two
characteristics of supranational law. Firstly, during the entire period
under consideration, supranational decision making is governed by the
Luxembourg compromise (unanimity voting of national governments).
This requirement not only reinforces the oversight capacity over
supranational independent institutionsso but also constitutes a serious
limit to their effective political capacity, particularly if national
preferences represented in the Council reflect wider bargains between
national executives and civil societies. 51 Thus, the technocratic
depoliticization associated with supranational law-making remains an
available course of action only if national governments manage to reach
a consensus. Secondly, in the foundational period, the supranational
executive maintains
a deferential attitude
toward national
constitutional democracies. Albeit constantly expanding its remit, the
supranational executive avoids interferences with the most salient
policy areas concerned with the redistribution of wealth, foreign policy,
or public security. 52 Fields such as taxation, social government, and
criminal law remain for a long time almost entirely governed under
national democratic constitutions. Insofar as the separation between
redistributive and efficiency-driven policies is maintained, the
supranational executive and national constitutional democracies
establish
a
virtuous
synergy
based
on
their
functional
complementarity.5 3
II. THE TRANSFORMATIVE PERIOD AND THE COMPETITION PARADIGM
The complementarity paradigm will sustain Europe's trente
gloriouses, and only with the crisis of social government and the
expansion of competences of supranational law will it be called into
question. Indeed, for at least twenty-five years the post-World War II

49. See MOUFFE, supra note 13, at 48-50.
50. LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 95.
51. See Christopher J. Bickerton et al., The New Intergovernmentalism: European
Integration in the Post-MaastrichtEra, 53 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 703, 708 (2015).
52. See Ernest A. Young, The European Union: A Comparative Perspective, in 3
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAw (Takis Tridimas ed., forthcoming 2018) (observing that,
although supranational law relies on member states for enforcement, supranational law
lacks federal identity and does not possess meaningful taxing and spending powers).
53. See Menon & Weatherill, supra note 45, at 23-24.
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nation-state, with the contribution of supranational law, fulfills its
promise to advance civilization through the democratic government of
capitalism: 54 it promotes unprecedented economic welfare, secures
increasing standards of social protection, and mediates previously
and
democracy
representative
through
conflicts
intractable
redistributive policies. 55 With the economic crisis in the mid-1970s,
however, social government and the institutions of the industrial society
become the target of wide criticism. 56 As the post-war compromise
unravels, national governments are pressured to transform the social
57
state with a view to reform national welfare structures. Boosting the
competitiveness of national economies by countering vested interests
arises as a priority. Yet, only a minority of European countries succeeds
in implementing this policy agenda. To overcome their difficulties,
national governments begin to look at supranational institutions as a
valuable vehicle to promote reform, due to their institutional expertise
in correcting national policies.5
Against this background, it does not come as a surprise to see in
those same years supranational institutions gradually adventuring into
supranational
against
ring-fenced
previously
areas
policy
interferences.5 9 If the initial expansion of supranational policy
initiatives toward social regulation6 0 is still coherent with an holistic
notion of market integration,6 1 the inroads made by the Union law into

54. See SCHARPF, supra note 22, at 33.
55. See BICKERTON, supra note 43, at 76-81.
56. See NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 137-66
(2008).
57. See BICKERTON, supra note 43, at 92-99.
58. Id. at 105-06. Negative integration in the 1970s already promoted the liberal
transformation of social market member states, which created incentives for regulatory
and tax competition. See Fritz W. Scharpf, After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel
EuropeanDemocracy, 21 EuR. L. J. 384, 386 (2015).
59. Already in the foundational period, negative and positive integration revealed a
predisposition to expand their scope. See Sacha Garben, Confronting the Competence
Conundrum: Democratisingthe European Union Through an Expansion of its Legislative
Powers, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 60-65 (2014).
60. See Giandomenico Majone, The European Community Between Social Policy and
Social Regulation, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 153, 154 (1993) (exploring the ambiguities of
the social dimension of European integration and defining social regulation as "primarily
occupational health and safety and equal treatment for men and women"). These
interventions constitute a complement to market regulation for their purpose is to
contrast unfair competition and even out potential economic asymmetries. See de Witte,
supranote 20, at 9-13.
61. See ALEXANDER SOMEK, INDIVIDUALISM: AN ESSAY ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 159-99 (2008).
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social, economic, and monetary policy with the Treaty of Maastricht 62
are clear signs that the original equilibrium based on the separation of
competences between the (national) redistributive state and the
(supranational) regulatory state is on the wane. Once the premises of
the complementary paradigm are undermined, the supranational
executive and constitutional democracies enter in a more competitive
relationship in which the former exerts pressures for transformation
and the latter oscillate between adjustment and resistance.
To be sure, a great deal of legal commentaries offer a much more
benign and gratifying account of this period. In this highly influential
literature, a lot of emphasis is put on the constitutional transformation
of the Union's normative claims and institutional architecture.63 As the
Union expands its remit, this narrative goes, its institutional profile
also undergoes remarkable change: Once a mainly intergovernmentaltechnocratic entity, the Union acquires a more robust political and
constitutional pedigree and reduces its distance from the idea of
constitutional democracy. Thus, losses in constitutional government at
the domestic level are somehow compensated by equivalent structures
and guarantees at the supranational one, with the net result that, all
things considered, constitutional democracy is healthy and thriving in
Europe also in this period.
Most of the elements inspiring this account for the European
integration process deserve careful consideration. For one, the
expansion of Union competences is coupled by a concomitant process of
revaluation of supranational law, that is, the incorporation of principles
and motives deriving from the tradition of national constitutional
democracies.64 Fundamental rights,6 5 citizenship,66 and substantive

62. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1.
Incursions into foreign policy, defense, immigration, and law and order are also worth
mentioning.
63. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts & Damien Gerard, The Structureof the Union According to
the Constitution for Europe: The Emperor is Getting Dressed, 29 EuR. L. REV. 289 (2004)
(concluding that the European Union, as a political authority in its own right, might
engender collective identification and contribute to the foundation of a European identity
by analyzing various formal and substantive development proposed by the Constitution
pertaining to the structure of the Union).
64. See Loic Azoulai, The European Court of Justice and the Duty to Respect Sensitive
National Interests, in JUDIcIAL ACTIVISM AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 167, 180-

83 (Mark Dawson et al. eds., 2013).
65. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6, Mar. 30, 2010,
2010 O.J. C 83/01, at 19 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
66. See id. art. 9, at 20; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union arts. 20-22, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 56-57 [hereinafter
TFEU].
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67
principles related to social justice are all elements that go into making
up a renovated supranational institutional framework. Moreover, in the
same period, the Union gains increased political capacity with the shift
to qualified majority voting in the Council in an ever-growing number of
policies. This process is paralleled by progresses also in the form of EU
government, marked by increasing parliamentarization. The European
Parliament evolves from a consultative to a deliberative legislative body
operating on an equal foothold with the Council.68 National parliaments
69
are also involved in supranational policy making, in a clear effort at
reconnecting supranational governance to national representative
government. 70 Even the European Commission, through the practice of
the Spitzen-kandidat, aspires to status of fully fledged accountable
71
parliamentary government. So, also from an institutional perspective,
it would seem that the Union abandons its executive-based and postpolitical culture to embrace constitutional democracy.
Nevertheless, for all the progresses made in incorporating
constitutional democratic motives, it can safely be argued that in this
period the Union does not abandon but just recalibrates and, ultimately,
reinforces its post-political profile. Admittedly, revaluation and
developments
important
remarkably
are
parliamentarization
nourishing a process of convergence of the Union institutional setting
toward constitutional democracy. This convergence, however, does not
amount to a conversion to constitutional democracy. With its emphasis
on constitutionalization, this narrative fails to consider other important
and more structural developments taking place in the same period that
witness a great deal of continuity in the ethos and institutional
architecture of the supranational executive. When these elements are
added to the picture, a remarkably different image of this period
emerges: the expansion of Union competences entails the exportation of
the supranational executive toward increasingly salient policy areas
democracies.
constitutional
national
by
presided
previously
Constitutional developments facilitate this process rendering more
and technocratic
sustainable the impact of intergovernmental
structures on core aspects of national constitutional democracies. But
the supranational executive maintains its dialectic profile vis-A-vis

67. See TFEU, supra note 66, arts. 8-17, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 53-55.
68. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 65, art. 14, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 22-23. This is valid
in the areas where the assent and ordinary legislative procedures apply.
69. See id. art. 12, at 21.
70. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 230-36.
71. See Joseph H. H. Weiler, Fateful Elections? Investing in the Future of Europe, 12
INT'L J. CONST. L. 273, 275-78 (2014).
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national constitutional democracies and, owing to its material
expansion, it engages in a competitive relationship with them.
To substantiate this alternative claim, the rationale underlying the
expansion of Union law must be first considered. As said, the
attribution of new competences to the Union responds primarily to the
pressing institutional demand of national governments to promote the
reform of social government. Tellingly, the expansion of powers is not
followed by a proportional increase of the Union budget. Supranational
policy making is attractive essentially because of its original distinctive
normative and institutional qualities: its capacity to constrain national

representative policy making and corporatist structures, its ability to
overcome national legal and political hurdles, and its promise to counter
vested interests opposing the transformation of social government.
Situated in a similar context, parliamentarization and revaluation may
be viewed as the legitimacy tools facilitating the expansion of the
supranational executive. In this way, they likely reinforce rather than
question the original post-political character of the Union. 72
The structure of the new competences confirms this general
impression. Indeed, the treaties may increase the influence of the
European Parliament and national parliaments in policy making, but
democratic contestation remains constrained by the purposive nature of
Union legislative competences. 73 Political capacity in fields like
monetary, employment, or industrial policy comes with predefined
policy directions. 74 Goals such as price stability, empowerment, and
competitiveness are prioritized,
leaving those furthering full
employment, social emancipation, and interventionist industrial policy
without the possibility to pursue their aspirations within the given
institutional framework.7 5

72. Overall, constitutionalization has largely succeeded not only in defusing the legal
resistances of national constitutional courts but also in co-opting the political Left in the
transformative agenda of the Union. The promise of a pan-European constitutional
democracy has worked as a bait for Left idealists convinced that the challenge of global
capitalism requires at least continental responses. It did not occur to them that, under the
guises of constitutional language, European integration had embraced a strategy aimed at
facilitating rather than governing capital dynamics. See Wolfgang Streeck, Heller, Schmitt
and the Euro, 21 EUR. L.J. 361, 365 (2015).
73. See Gareth Davies, Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive
Competence, 21 EUR. L.J. 2, 2 (2015).
74. See TFEU, supra note 66, arts. 127, 145, 173, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 102-03, 112, 126.
On the phenomenon of overconstitutionalization in the EU, see generally Grimm, supra
note 11.
75. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 243 (1999) ("The whole point of
voting is that ...
social ends are to be determined collectively by millions of individual
judgments. But that can hardly be so if the process of enfranchising, counting, and
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But the challenge to constitutional democracy inherent in the new
competences is not confined to the procedural dimension. From a more
substantive standpoint, the material expansion of the Union reduces the
capacity of democratic politics to deal with capitalism and contributes to
76
rising social inequality and the erosion of public services. As in the
foundational period with the common market project, in the
transformative period the Union is entrusted with a specific policy
enable supranational
competences
Newly attributed
agenda.
institutions to pursue advanced liberalism, a set of policies aimed at
improving the competitiveness of national economies by means of a
reorientation of social government toward entrepreneurship, the
instauration of a market of services, and the empowerment of the
workforce.7 7 In particular, the Economic and Monetary Union is
deployed as a strategic lever to counter vested interests and reform
social models in contingent policy areas. 78 In this period, therefore, the
Union does not renounce but strengthen its original role of vehiculo
externo for structural change.79 In the newly acquired policy fields, the
supranational executive operates as a major force of transformation: by
dictating the direction of national policy making8 0 and pushing forward
in post-political regulatory style the reforms experimented in avantgarde countries, 81 it enters in a competitive relationship with
constitutional democracy challenging its normative claims and
institutional structures.
A number of other developments regarding the renovated Union
institutional architecture confirm its post-political character. First of
all, the role of the European Parliament requires careful consideration.
Despite its considerable empowerment and its capacity to appoint and
censure the Commission, the European Parliament is not in the position
of holding accountable the European Council, that is, the institution
directing supranational policy making. 82 The European Parliament is
not grounded in a majoritarian institutional setting but in an executive

implementing these judgements is governed and modified by some prior and entrenched
selection among the alternatives.").
76. See Scharpf, supra note 58, at 385.
77. See ROSE, supra note 56, at 139-42.
78. See Kevin Featherstone, The Political Dynamics of the Vincolo Esterno: The
Emergence of EMU and the Challenge to the European Social Model, 9-15 (Queen's Papers
on Europeanisation, Working Paper No. 6, 2001).
79. See BICKERTON, supra note 43, at 131-36.
80. See Featherstone, supra note 78, at 8.
81. See id. at 6-7, 13.
82. See Philipp Dann, European Parliamentand Executive Federalism:Approaching a
Parliamentin a Semi-ParliamentaryDemocracy, 9 EUR. L.J. 549, 558 (2003).
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based structure.8 3 Over the years its lawmaking powers have constantly
increased, but even in the policy fields where its legislative role is more
pronounced, the European Parliament is far from functioning as the
central political forum imparting democratic legitimacy to the overall
institutional structure. The type of political participation it offers is
similar to that existing in mixed regimes, where popular elements are
inserted in a broader structure alongside other sources of legitimacy.
But this hardly amounts to the type of political participation postulated
in the idea of constitutional democracy. 84
What is worse is that in its actual contribution to lawmaking, the
European Parliament falls short of democratic standards. Rather than
improving the transparency and contestation of decision-making
procedures, the European Parliament has been sucked into the
executive mode of diplomatic and opaque bargaining.8 5 This is largely
the result of practices known as "first reading agreements" and
"trialogues," informal meetings in which legislation is agreed among
representatives of the Commission, the COREPER, and representatives
of the relevant parliamentary standing committee.86 Recourse to these
informal practices is usually justified pointing at the need of the Union
to maintain high levels of legislative productivity, even if this may be
detrimental to the democratic quality of lawmaking. Yet, "first reading
agreements" and "trialogues" are controversial for their lack of
transparency, their exposure to regulatory capture, and their
marginalizing effects on the smaller parties represented in the
European
Parliament.8 7
It
is
particularly
this
de facto
83. Id. at 553-54.
84. See WALDRON, supra note 74, at 235 ("[W]hen participation in politics is demanded
these days as a human right, it usually means much more than this. The demand is not
merely that there should be a popular element in government, but that the popular
element should be decisive. The demand is for democracy, not just the inclusion of a
democratic element in a mixed regime.").
85. See Deirdre Curtin, ChallengingExecutive Dominance in EuropeanDemocracy, 77
MOD. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2014).
86. See DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAw: TEXT AND MATERIALS 120-

22 (3d ed. 2014). Figures show that in 1999-2004, only 28% of EU legislation was
approved in the informal meetings. However, in 2004-12, this modus operandi was
employed in 79.5% of approved dossiers. Id. at 121.
87. See generally OLIVIER COSTA ET AL., CODECISION AND "EARLY AGREEMENTS": AN
IMPROVEMENT OR A SUBVERSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE? (2011) (exploring two

unanswered areas regarding first readings and the conciliation procedure: (1) the origins
of early agreements; and (2) the impact of such practice on the way the institutions
function and how their respective actors relate to them); Henry Farrell & Adrienne
H6ritier, Interorganizational Negotiation and IntraorganizationalPower in Shared
Decision Making: Early Agreements Under Codecision and Their Impact on the European
Parliament and Council, 37 COMP. POL. STUD. 1184 (2004) (arguing that exogenous
changes in macro-institutional rules, which result in a move from formal and sequential to
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disenfranchisement of smaller parties that is a source of concern from a
democratic perspective. For a long time, the Union has been ruled by a
gro/Je Koalition composed of the European People's Party and the Party
of European Socialists. Whereas this coalition has secured the Union a
stable government, it has also stifled the emergence of an effective
political opposition within the Union institutional setting. Sure,
Eurosceptic parties have won a remarkable number of seats, but, due to
"first reading agreements" and "trialogues," their presence within the
European Parliament is largely symbolic. This marginalization,
however, comes at a cost: Rather than nourishing vibrant contestation
within the institutions, political opposition articulates its claims against
the institutions, perceived as representing only a supranational elite
and foreclosing any meaningful possibility of democratic contestation.88
The relative importance of parliamentarization in the EU is then
evident in the growth of alternative decision-making processes. It is
noteworthy, for instance, that in a period in which the European
Parliament increases its influence in legislation, lawmaking in the same
policy areas migrates toward other less dignified institutional
destinations.8 9 Political administration emerges as a new regulatory
function carried out in the post-legislative phase by a variety of bodies
including committees, regulatory agencies, and private entities involved
in co- and self-regulation.9 0 Here, it is impossible to detail the
functioning, structure, and rationales of this vast range of bodies. Yet, a
number of common elements can be identified, which witness the limits
91
of the Union's democratic commitment in the transformative period.
issues.
Firstly, political administration is not restricted to minor
Although the treaty discipline of legislative delegation in the treaties is
formally stringent, 92 salient political decisions are adopted in the postlegislative phase, with the result that decisions normally subject to
democratic deliberation are transferred to technocratic decision
making.9 3 This brings in a second aspect that goes to the nature and
institutional culture of these bodies: the organs carrying out functions of
informal and simultaneous interaction between collective actors, will lead to changes in
individual actors' respective influence over outcomes within organizations).
88. See Mair, supra note 47, at 7.
89. See Damian Chalmers & Mariana Chaves, EU Law-Making and the State of
European Democratic Agency, in DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN A EUROPEAN UNION UNDER
STRESS 155, 155 (Olaf Cramme & Sara B. Hobolt eds., 2014).
90. See Renaud Dehousse, Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European
Governance, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET 207, 209-10
(Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002).
91. See SOMEK, supra note 61, at 165-68.
92. See TFEU, supra note 66, arts. 290-91, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 172-73.
93. See Dehousse, supra note 90, at 209-10.
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political administration are mainly composed of government officials
and experts operating in the light of a consensus culture in which
scientific expertise is privileged over alternative knowledge
paradigms.94 The epistemic communities developing within committees
or regulatory agencies enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy vis-A-vis
national governments to which they are in principle accountable.9 5 Also,
democratic control on their operation is weak: parliamentary oversight
is at best occasional,96 and the participatory opportunities for
stakeholders underdeveloped.97
The final element cautioning against the constitutional narrative
and substantiating the rise of the supranational executive is referred to
the modes of policy making adopted in the most salient fields included
in Union competences. Already in the foundational period, the
incremental material expansion of supranational policy making was
accompanied by a supplement of delegation by national governments
guaranteed by the participation of the European Council.98 This trend
intensifies in the transformative period, where newly acquired policy
fields become the locus for a higher accumulation of Union executive
power.99 The supranational institutional setting experimented in these
areas gives rise to a constellation different from the more ordinary
patterns of executive dominance developed by the Union. For one, in
these areas independent institutions such as the Commission and the
Court of Justice play a much more limited role. The supranational
executive relies essentially on intergovernmental institutions entrusted
with tasks of policy coordination.100 Supranational policy making does
not preempt national governments, and, to a large extent, salient policy
fields such as economic or social policies remain formally governed
94. See generally Mihail Kritikos, TraditionalRisk Analysis and Releases of GMOs into
the European Union: Space for Non-Scientific Factors?, 34 EuR. L. REV. 405 (2009) (asking
whether the institutional design of the decision-making procedures has proved to be an
effective way to provide an inclusive and responsive transnational regulatory platform).
95. See generally Christian Joerges & Jurgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental
Bargainingto Deliberative PoliticalProcesses: The Constitutionalisationof Comitology, 3
EUR. L.J. 273 (1997) (arguing that the irresistible rise of Comitology is an institutional
response, on the one hand, to the deep-seated tensions between the dual supranational
and intergovernmentalist structure of the Community, and, on the other hand, to its
problem-solving tasks).
96. See Deirdre Curtin, Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to
Public Account, 13 EUR. L.J. 523, 524-31 (2007).
97. See Renaud Dehousse, Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutionalism in a
PolycentricPolity, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 135, 150-56 (J.
H. H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
98. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 129-30.
99. See Curtin, supra note 85, at 6-7.
100. See Bickerton et al., supra note 51, at 711.
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under national democratic constitutions. Supranational institutions,
however, are entrusted with the definition of general guidelines steering
national policy making and the monitoring and control of their
implementation. Thus, competences subject to coordination reveal a
lower degree of centralization and a more prominent role assigned to
democratic legislative processes. This more decentralized structure,
however, is not exempted from post-political characterization.
Supranational intervention in these fields comes with predefined policy
strategies aiming at undoing national rigid positions 0 1 and sidelining
national existing constellations. 102 Subject to technocratic guidelines
and control, national democratic institutions are pressured toward the
advanced liberal agenda. Coordination, therefore, results in a more
sophisticated form of co-optation of national constitutional democracies
in the transformative agenda of the supranational executive. Owing to
the ramifications of economic and social policy, it expresses a wideranging steering potential in fields such as energy, research, education,
social security, and pensions.10 3 In the period under review, this
potential is not fully exploited. Due to their soft-law nature, policy
guidelines and control mechanisms appear rather ineffective devices for
prompting

the

expected

degree

of

transformation. 104

Still,

the

supranational executive establishes in this period an outpost in these
policy fields, which, with the economic and financial crisis, will be
strengthened, becoming more effective and problematic. 105
In sum, the policy goals and institutional culture inspiring the
Union in the transformative period corroborate the challenge to
constitutional democracy latent in the foundational period.106 The
expansion of Union post-political structures toward more salient policy
areas obscures the original division of labor underpinning the
complementarity paradigm and generates an alternative and more
problematic pattern of relation. The policy areas where supranational
and national law increasingly overlap become a terrain of competition
between the transformative ambitions of the Union and the normative
claims of national constitutional democracies. European public law
becomes the center of peculiar legal and political tensions. On the one
101. Id. at 708.
102. See Garben, supra note 59, at 66-68.
103. See, e.g., Eur. Comm'n, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation of
27.4.2010 on Broad Guidelines for the Economic Policies of the Member States and of the
Union, Part I of the Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines, SEC (2010) 488 final (Apr. 27,
2010).
104. See Servaas Deroose et al., The Broad Economic Policy-Guidelines:Before and After
the Re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy, 46 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 827, 834-36 (2008).
105. See infra Part Ill.
106. See supra Part II.
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hand, measures viewed at a national level as genuine social policy
achievements are challenged by supranational law as containing a
social-democratic bias requiring an element of correction. On the other,
transformative measures promoted by the Union as attempts to counter
vested interests and the crisis of social government appear in
constitutional democracies as neoliberal efforts justifying constitutional
resistance. Of course, parliamentarization, the revaluation of
supranational law, and the checks and balances inserted in the treaties
offer plenty of opportunities to internalize constitutional normative
claims within the dominant supranational agenda and make
supranational law more sustainable.1 0 7 Yet, the dominant policy agenda
remains largely insulated from legitimate political contestation.10 8 This
generates a more intractable and unmediated type of conflict between
insiders of the European integration process, interested in harnessing
the opportunities inherent in its policy agenda and cosmopolitan
ethos, 09 and the outsiders, experiencing the Union as an ahistorical and
authoritarian threat to their cherished civil identities and constitutional
structures. 110 Owing to the checks and balances inserted in the treaties,
throughout the transformative period these mutually delegitimizing
tensions manifest themselves only episodically. Conflicts will erupt
spectacularly with the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005,
when the sleeping giant of European opposition will be awakened.'
But the situation will grow even more sour with the economic and
financial crisis.

107. See generally Kalypso Nicolaidis, The JCMS Annual Review Lecture- Sustainable
Integration: Towards EU 2.0?, 48 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 21 (2010) (arguing that the EU
will only be sustainable as a political project if its leaders and citizens abandon the
equation of integration with oneness, top-down policy design and simple hierarchical
structures, all of which are anachronistic in a 2.0 world).
108. This is why attempts at politicization within the current institutional architecture
such as the Spitzen-kandidat experiment are largely unsuccessful. See generally Marco
Goldoni, PoliticisingEU Lawmaking? The Spitzenkandidaten Experiment as a Cautionary
Tale, 22 EuR. L.J. 279 (2016) (putting forward a sobering account of the normative and
instrumental reasons that explain why expectations regarding the Spitzenkandidaten
experiment were grounded on shaky premises and the experiment could not have
delivered its promises).
109. See SOMEK, supra note 10, at 282.
110. See Damian Chalmers, The Unconfined Power of European Union Law, 1 EUR.
PAPERS 405, 424-31 (2016).
111. See Mair, supra note 47, at 12-13.
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III. THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ENCROACHMENT
PARADIGM

With the Lisbon Treaty, European integration seems to have
reached a stable constitutional settlement.11 2 The Union appears in the
position to cope with any likely challenge by maintaining its postpolitical profile. In European circles, depoliticization is regarded as a
rather successful strategy enabling pragmatic problem solving and
incremental reform.113 The outbreak of the economic and financial crisis
proved this prediction both right and wrong. The Union responds to the
crisis without dramatic constitutional changes.11 4 Yet, in continuing its
previous modus operandi, it becomes more salient and divisive."15 The
policy measures and institutional arrangements adopted to cope with
the crisis radicalize the transformative commitment of the
supranational executive. Correspondingly, national constitutional
democracies are downscaled to a subservient role, aggravating the postpolitical drift of European public law.
The diagnosis underpinning a similar development is that the
economic and financial crisis only exposed structural weaknesses in
national economies,116 particularly in the countries that previously
failed to implement the advanced liberalism agenda. Hence,
institutional devices and policy measures are designed to embolden the
Union transformational commitment. On the one hand, financial
stability is promoted through plans of fiscal consolidation and financial
assistance.11 7 On the other hand, the reform of social government is
inculcated to recalcitrant member states through more stringent
direction and control of national political economies, even at the cost of
encroaching on constitutional democracy.1 18 Justified as it may be on

112. See Moravcsik, supra note 24, at 158.
113. See id. at 180.
114. See Bruno De Witte, Euro Crisis Responses and the EU Legal Order: Increased
Institutional Variationor ConstitutionalMutation?, 11 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 434, 453-57.
115. Damian Chalmers et al., The Retransformation of Europe, in THE END OF THE
EUROCRATS' DREAM: ADJUSTING TO EUROPEAN DIVERSITY 1, 6 (Damian Chalmers et al.
eds., 2016).
116. See Eur. Comm'n, Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive
Growth, at 7, COM (2010) 2020 final (March 3, 2010).
117. See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 1, 2012, EC
D/12/3. Financial assistance has also been provided by the European Central Bank
through the Securities Market Programme and Expanded Asset Purchase Program. See
Asset PurchaseProgrammes,EUR. CENTRAL BANK, https/www.ecb.europa-eu/mopoimplement
/omt/html/index.en.html (last visited March 22, 2017).
118. See Eur. Comm'n, supra note 116, at 7. See also Treaty on Stability, Coordination
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, art. 1(1), Feb. 1, 2012, EC D/12/2
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policy grounds, however, this strategy undermines the precarious
equilibrium existing in the previous stage and renders more concrete
the dangers inherent in the rise of the supranational executive.
Looking more in detail at these developments, the measures
introduced to cope with the financial crisis entail first of all a further
expansion of EU competences.11 9 To a large extent, this results from the
ramifications of economic and monetary union (EMU): as in the
transformative period the regulation of the single market justified
interventions also in ancillary areas such as environmental or consumer
law, during the crisis the EMU brings the supranational executive into
the core of national social government. 120 Owing to the newly
established
instruments
of
macroeconomic
coordination, 1 21
supranational intergovernmental and technocratic institutions take
hold of issues such as wages, productivity, pensions, social security, and
national public and private indebtedness.1 22
This development invites two different types of reflections. Firstly,
this peculiar expansion of competences detaches the Union from the
evolutionary trajectory of mature federal systems. Mature federal
systems have traditionally followed a path to centralization centered on
the establishment of welfare structures: It was the inability of state and
local governments to respond to the Great Depression that motivated
the development of welfare institutions at the federal level during the
New Deal. 123 Centralization in the Union follows an opposite path: It is
the incapacity of national governments to reform or dismantle welfare
institutions1 24 that motivates centralization in the form of an expansion
[hereinafter TSCG]; Eur. Council, Conclusions - 24/25 March 2011, 13-15 [hereinafter
Euro Plus Pact].
119. See Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, ConstitutionalBalance in the EU After the
Euro-Crisis, 76 MOD. L. REV. 817, 824-26 (2013).
120. See Chalmers et al., supra note 115, at 19.
121. Article 9 of the TSCG establishes policy coordination "in all the domains which are
essential to the good functioning of the euro area." TSCG, supra note 117, art. 9. See also
Euro Plus Pact, supra note 17, at 13, 14-15 (dictating actions in areas where the
competence lies with the member states such as wage setting arrangements, education
systems, pensions, health and social assistance). In addition, Articles 3 and 4 of
Regulation 1176/2011 extend policy surveillance by supranational institutions towards
private indebtedness, the housing market, and energy. See Commission Regulation
1176/2011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the
Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 25, 29.
Finally, the Compact for Growth and Jobs calls for reforms in the field of public
administration and justice. Eur. Council, Conclusions - 28/29 June, 2012, 9.
122. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of
Democracy 30 (LEQS Paper No. 36, 2011).
123. See Young, supra note 52, at 44.
124. See de Witte, supra note 20, at 13-17 (observing that, in this phase, social policy is
viewed as inimical to the function of the market and EMU).
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of the regulatory state beyond its original remit.125 Secondly,
centralization is not only peculiar but is also concerning. In many
instances, the coordination mechanisms approved during the crisis
destabilize the competence boundaries established by the Lisbon
Treaty. 126 Short of effective institutional constraints and accountability
mechanisms, the Union gradually replaces national institutions in their
decision to delegate powers to the supranational executive, lending to
European public law arrangements a disturbing authoritarian
connotation.1 27

The encroachment of the supranational executive on national
constitutional democracies does not ensue only from its further and
uncontrolled material expansion. It also relates to the style of policy
making embraced by the Union in the newly acquired competences.
Material expansion, indeed, does not usher in a radical rethinking of the
policy goals and institutional profile of supranational law. On the
abandons
Union
the
scope,
its
expanding
in
contrary,
parliamentarization and revaluation, the constitutional tools previously
employed to vehicle into national constitutional democracies its
transformative agenda. Set aside the constitutional register, the Union
shows its crudest intergovernmental and technocratic side by extending
its regulatory machinery to pursue even more widely and effectively the
liberalizing agenda inspiring the transformative period and, in this way,
to promote the degree of convergence of national economies required by
the EMU.128 The goals of promoting supply-side reforms and the
introduction of wage cuts emerge as the only policy options available for
29
encouraging an export led recovery of national economies.1 To pursue
this unpopular agenda, national governments intensify their horizontal
ties to shield macroeconomic policy from the intrusion of mobilized and
angry societies.130
The corrosive potential of this strategy emerges in both its
substantive and procedural dimension. From a substantive standpoint,
national budgetary processes are constrained by a web of
macroeconomic targets, whose strictness at least in part depends on the
financial situation of individual member states.131 The proliferation of
125. See infra Part III.
126. See Alexander Somek, Delegation and Authority: AuthoritarianLiberalism Today,

21 EuRo. L.J. 340, 342-43 (2015).
127. See id. at 346-47 (examining this authoritarian turn of delegation).
128. See Damian Chalmers, The EuropeanRedistributive State and a European Law of

Struggle, 18 EuR. L.J. 667, 685 (2012).
129. See Scharpf, supra note 58, at 391.
130. See BICKERTON, supra note 43, at 144, 149-50.
131. See Mark Dawson, The Legal and PoliticalAccountability Structure of 'Post-Crisis'
EU Economic Governance, 53 J. COMMON IKT. STUD. 976, 981-82 (2015).
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macroeconomic indicators generates a form of public power informed by
expertise and insulated from the vagaries of politics. What is more,
macroeconomic indicators and the language of numbers displace
constitutional language and, in particular, fundamental rights as the
main coordinates of economic and social policies. In the emerging legal
framework, fundamental rights can be protected and inspire policy
making, but only within the margins indicated by macroeconomic
indicators and surveying supranational institutions.
This brings in the procedural dimension of the new coordinating
mechanisms. Two so far have been the institutions that most benefited
from the new economic governance. Firstly, the European Council has
increased its role as agenda setter and crisis manager.132 As a reflection,
a more informal and secretive style of policy making has emerged.133
Secondly, the European Central Bank has intensified its activity, in
particular supplementing the European Council when the divisions
between
national
governments
stalled
decision
making. 134
Consequently, the routine operation of the new economic governance
combines intergovernmental decision making with the supervisory
framework of the community method. 35 In order to manage and enforce
macroeconomic indicators, the Union promotes more intensive forms of
policy coordination of national economic and social policies.136
Multilateral surveillance on national budgets is secured through stricter
and quasi-automatic sanctions,1 3 7 and structural reforms are
encouraged with the promise of a more relaxed fiscal discipline. 38 As a

132. See Curtin, supra note 85, at 7. There are different views on whether this is
consistent with the role assigned by the Lisbon Treaty or entails a more profound and
structural change. Compare De Witte, supra note 114, at 450 (concluding that the euro
crisis has not led to a profound constitutional mutation of the EU order because neither
the Maastricht Treaty nor the Lisbon Treaty provided the European Union with a unified
institutional architecture, and the euro crisis reforms have 'merely' deepened the
institutional variation existing between EMU law and other areas of EU law), with
Chalmers et al., supra note 115, at 4 ("[The increased role of the European Council is not
merely a phenomenon that accompanied the most dramatic years of the crisis but a longterm structural change which the crisis brought to the forefront.").
133. See Curtin, supra note 85, at 20-21. Wolfgang Streeck has also observed that the
primacy of the European Council in economic governance replaces class struggle with
diplomacy. See Streeck, supra note 72, at 367.
134. See Chalmers et al., supra note 115, at 4.
135. See Dawson, supra note 131, at 978-83.
136. See id. at 984-86.
137. See Commission Regulation 1173/2011, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in
the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 1, 3; TSCG, supra note 117, art. 7.
138. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1175/2011, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 November 2011 Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the
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result, national policy making develops within stricter and more rigid
constraints that, in the case of countries receiving financial assistance,
entail a de facto evacuation of representative institutions by the
supranational executive. 139 Entrusted with essentially implementing
tasks, parliaments and, more generally, constitutional democracies are
relegated to the largely symbolic role of lending mass support to the
demands of administrative and economic rationality.140
Doubts may be expressed as to the long-term capacity of the
supranational executive to obtain this form of acclaim.141 Deference to
expertise at the cost of participation is a successful strategy as long as it
provides in exchange effective problem solving. As the current
macroeconomic arrangements fail to secure prosperity and social
protection, it cannot be ruled out that, sooner or later, national
constitutional democracies will turn into a less cooperative pattern of
relationship. Constitutional democracy is a powerful idea that could
inspire political actors in resisting the current institutional trend and
formulating proposals to realign Europe's legal reality and
constitutional imagination. 142
CONCLUSION

The rise of the supranational executive is certainly part of a wider
phenomenon of migration of executive power toward modes of decision
making eschewing electoral accountability and popular democratic
control.1 43 It is also a distinctively European phenomenon for its
peculiar entanglement with some of the main achievements of postWorld War II European civilization such as constitutional democracy,
the welfare state, and supranationalism.1 44 The excursus developed in
this article has tried to track this path toward executive dominance and
the corresponding displacement of national constitutional democracies.
It has shown how, under this development, public law arrangements
Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and
Coordination of Economic Policies, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 12, 16.
139. This is most visible when national institutions are required to implement packages
of reforms negotiated with the 'Troika' of the International Monetary Fund, the European
Commission and the European Central Bank. See Chalmers et al., supra note 114, at 5.
140. See Somek, supra note 126, at 347-48.
141. See Damian Chalmers, European Restatements of Sovereignty 20-23 (LSE Law,
Society and Econ., Working Paper No. 10, 2013).
142. See Menbndez, supra note 4, at 521-26.
143. See Curtin, supranote 85, at 3.
144. See Jirgen Habermas & Jacques Derrida, February 15, or What Binds Europeans
Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe, 10
CONSTELLATIONS 291, 293-95 (2003).
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have acquired an increasingly post-political character sitting
uncomfortably with prevailing European constitutional imagination.
This phenomenon is the consequence of a deliberate and legitimate
strategy initially conceived to strengthen and complement the operation
of national constitutional democracies in the circumstances of economic
interdependence. More recently, this trend has accentuated the
relativization of constitutional democracy under the shadow of economic
and financial necessity, giving rise to an institutional constellation of
dubious legitimacy. While exerting almost uncontested symbolical
hegemony, constitutional democracy suffers from a process of gradual
evacuation, aggravated by an extensive use of constitutional language
aimed sedating national constitutional resistance.
It is difficult to predict whether the strategy of depoliticization
underlying the rise of the supranational executive will continue to
secure stability to the European integration project. In parallel with the
expansion of executive dominance, populism has grown as a regular
feature of European politics.1 45 To a considerable extent, this
phenomenon mirrors in grotesque forms certain aspects of the
supranational executive. In identifying a conflict between a pure people
and corrupt elites,1 46 it plays also politics in the moral register. In
delegitimizing expertise, it also shows scarce respect for the normative
claims of the political opponent. In paying only lip service to the
institutions of constitutional democracy,1 47 it further contributes to its
decline.
But as the conflicts at the center of European politics are
increasingly articulated as an intractable confrontation between
technocracy and populism,148 a rehabilitation of constitutional
democracy appears as the most valuable solution to internalize
discontent and energize European public law. In the years following the
outbreak of the crisis, a number of proposals have been put forward as
alternatives to less inspiring plans of the Union institutions
perpetuating the status quo.149 For the most visionary of the
commentators, a pan-European constitutional democracy remains the
preferable solution to counter the current post-political trend. 50 A more
145. See Cas Mudde, The PopulistZeitgeist, 39 GOVT & OPPOSITION 541, 551-55 (2004).
146. See id. at 543-44.
147. See id. at 561.
148. BICKERTON, supra note 43, at 182-83.
149. See, e.g., The Five President'sReport: Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary
Union (June 22, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-politicaldfiles5-presidents-report

en.pdf
150. See generally HABERMAS, THE LURE, supra note 6 (arguing that only if the
technocratic approach is replaced by a deeper democratization of the European
institutions can the European Union fulfill its promise as a model for how rampant
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democratic and statist Union is presented as the way forward to cope
with global capitalism, 151 restore the functional cleavages mobilizing
democratic politics, and secure collective self-determination. 152 One may
doubt, however, that the unpteenth appeal to European citizens will
motivate them to reappropriate Europe. 153 Skepticism seems justified
not only because long-standing structural obstacles stand still in the
1 54
and
way of the creation of a robust European political system
55
but also because the actual political
supranational budget,1
commitment of contemporary European individuals cannot be taken for
granted.156
An alternative strategy to revitalize constitutional democracy
rejects as unrealistic and undesirable the statist democratization of the
Union and suggests a retreat of the supranational executive within the
original boundaries of market regulation.1 5 7 The idea to revert to the
complementarity paradigm and employ national delegations as
resistance norms against supranational encroachment inspires the
constitutional challenges against the most recent expansion of executive
rule, 58 but transpires also in the writings of commentators enhancing
59
and
both the distinctive institutional capacity of supranational law'
1
the achievements of constitutional democracy. 0 This scenario,
however, appears scarcely plausible. First, it contradicts functionality, a
persisting feature of supranational law that can possibly be controlled
1
but hardly eradicated. 16 Second, and more critically, it implies the
reconsideration (if not the total dismantlement) of a series of
supranational projects that either have become entangled with
market capitalism can once again be brought under political control at the supranational
level).
151. See Scheuerman, supranote 7, at 311-12.
152. See Mark Dawson & Floris deWitte, From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution
for the EU, 22 EUR. L.J. 204, 209-14 (2016).
153. See Somek, supra note 3, at 160-62.
154. See generally Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 EUR. L.J. 282
(1995) (looking at the calls for a European constitution and asking how far they are
already met by the treaties and what consequences fully meeting them would have for the
European Union and Member States).
155. See GIANDOMENIcO MAJONE, DILEMMAS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE
AMBIGUITIES AND PITFALLS OF INTEGRATION BY STEALTH 207 (2005).

156. See infra Conclusion.
157. See MAJONE, supra note 155, at 159-61.
158. These challenges have given rise to a series of influential rulings by the German
Constitutional Court. See, e.g., BVerfG, 2 BvR 2/08, June 30, 2009, httpJ/www.bverfg.de/e/es
20090630_2bve000208en.html;- BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, Jan. 14, 2014, httpsJ/www.bundesverfa
ssungsgerichtde/entscheidungen/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html
159. See Menon & Weatherill, supra note 45, at 27.
160. See STREECK, supra note 5, at 189.
161. See Garben, supra note 59, at 75-76.
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European integration 62 or are badly needed to cope with other
contemporary challenges. 163
Between these nonstarters, other less spectacular but more realistic
solutions can be advanced to delineate a type of supranational executive
more open, democratic, and respectful of national constitutional
democracies. Underpinning these proposals is the consideration that
constitutional democracy in Europe has almost invariably coexisted
with executive-based supranational structures. In a variety of fields
alongside market integration, the latter may contribute to strengthen
political capacity and counter national biases in policy making. They are
also formulated on the methodological assumption that, in a peculiar
polity such as the Union, democratic ideals conceived in state polities
cannot simply be replicated, but may require considerable adjustment
and transformation.1 64
Increased politicization to internalize dissent is the driving motive
of proposals devised on the conviction that antisystem opposition may
be disarmed when more chances of legitimate opposition are offered. 65
In this vein, opening up (or even deconstitutionalizing) Union policy
objectives'6 6 and, more generally, reconsidering the tendency of
supranational law to operate as an agent of transformation rather than
a container of political conflicts are valuable suggestions. 6 7
Politicization can also be increased through proactive and networked
mobilization of national parliaments in order to provide legitimate
countervailing power to the supranational executive.18 A more
sustainable engagement between the supranational executive and
national constitutional democracies could finally be attempted with a
new system of opting-outs and differentiated integration more
respectful of national constitutional diversities. 69

.

162. This is, in particular, the case of the EMU.
163. This is the case of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice on the face of the
refugee crisis. See Justice, Freedom and Security, EUR-LEX, httpI//eur-lex.europa.eulsumma
ry/chapterustice freedom security.html?rootdefault=SUM_1_CODED%3D23&locale-en
(last visited Mar. 24, 2017) ("The European Union's area of freedom, security and justice
was created to ensure the free movement of persons and to offer a high level of protection
to citizens. It .. . includes asylum and immigration policies and the fight against crime. .

164. On gradualist and transformationalist theories of future democracy, see Francis
Cheneval & Frank Schimmelfennig, The Case for Demoicracy in the European Union, 51 J.
COMMON MET. STUD. 334, 336 (2013).
165. See Mair, supra note 47, at 6.
166. See Dawson & deWitte, supra note 152, at 214-17.
167. See id. at 221-23.
168. See, e.g., Curtin, supranote 85 at 23-32; Goldoni, supra note 107, at 292-94.
169. See Scharpf, supra note 58, at 400-04.
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Although the perspective of a more open, democratic, and respectful
supranational executive could inspire political mobilization and
institutional rethinking, another more disturbing scenario must be
taken into consideration. Previous proposals all assume that
70
constitutional democracy may still exert its subversive force,o and that
the resentment of European individuals is a product of the curtailment
of their participatory chances. But what if contemporary populism is
instead focused only on the poor outputs of European policy making? 7 1
And what if European citizens have internalized an ethos prioritising
outputs over political self-determination? Institutional settings develop
an intimate complex relationship with subjects, hence the possibility
that the rise of the supranational executive and the corresponding
displacement of constitutional democracy may have generated
depoliticized European individuals cannot be easily discarded. 172 A large
number of Europeans certainly resent the Union because of
unemployment, high taxation, intrusive regulation, declining levels of
welfare provisions, immigration, and terrorism. But this does not
necessarily mean that they would oppose a post-political order
entrusted with risk regulation and crisis management able to provide a
modicum of prosperity, welfare, and security. 7 3 Were this to be the case,
and were European public law to remain cloaked with constitutional
language, we could witness a critical transformation in the history of
both European public law and constitutionalism. Stripped of its promise
of political freedom and social emancipation, constitutionalism would
74
turn into an ideology legitimating administrative domination.1

170. See Loughlin, supra note 1, at 13.
171. See Mudde, supra note 145, at 558-60.
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Azoulai et al. eds., 2016).
173. See SOMEK, supra note 10, at 31-32 ("Internal cosmopolitans demand risk
regulation and crisis intervention. They are completely indifferent as to whether it is
national or international bodies that provide the solution.").
174. See Loughlin, supra note 1, at 20-23.
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